IMPEACHMENT: LETTERS FROM ALEXANDRIA: NO2

LETTER NO.2

“Onward Christian Neocons, marching as to war!” There is more truth here than my frivolous paraphrasing.

That which the American people must understand regarding the “Neocons” is that they have as a group a delusional unrealistic vision of the world and goals that are:

(1) INCONSISTENT with traditional American traditions,

(2) PREMISED on faulty base assumptions,

(3) CATAPULT this nation into “Aggressor Nation” status internationally,

(4) IMPERIL world peace by converting the Middle East into a tinder box for the ignition of a world wide conflagration,

(5) REALIZABLE only if the democratic structure and governance systems of this nation are subject to massive corruption, destruction coupled with a Fascist-derivative form, under mining the basic legal structures and principles of this nation,

(6) ACCOMPANIED by the establishment of an Imperial Executive branch that empowers itself sufficiently as to render the Legislative branch powerless to the point where its’ actions are meaningless and the Judicial machinery of the nation is ignored with impunity, or is co-opted as an instrument of its’ actions,

(7) CHARACTERIZED by wholesale ignorance of the public’s most serious needs, allowing those issues to become sources of dissatisfaction, dissatisfaction manipulated to their advantage by shifting the onus of blame to other entities, organizations, or individuals they wish to isolate, demonize and busy with their own self defense, thus neutralizing any impact they might have or the policies, programs and actions of the administration, snd

(8) FLAWED in terms of real world considerations and their “understanding” of human nature and the human condition.

Historically, neoconservatives supported a militant anticommunism, tolerated more social welfare spending than was sometimes acceptable to libertarians and mainstream conservatives, supported civil equality for blacks and other minorities, and sympathized with a non-traditional foreign policy agenda that was less deferential to traditional conceptions of diplomacy and international law and less inclined to compromise principles, even if that meant unilateral action.

The key at this point is the word, historically, and like so many other things a corruption of principles or philosophies, via, delimiting selective embrace, a sort of perverted evolution set in.

In fact, some people described as "neocons" today say that neoconservatism no longer exists as an identifiable movement.

I am not inclined to go that far. Their remain theoretical purists Neocons, but our concern is with the Bush Bunch, the Bush Brand, the distilled simplified version, those who taken the larger body of thought and theory and reduced it in a Chinese Restaurant like approach, picking and chosing from column “A” and column “B” to make up their political meal.

That process is best seen in the words of Neocon Irving Kristol, the founder and "god-father" of Neoconservatism, who defines/ delimits the larger body of thought and principle into : “There are three basic pillars of Neoconservatism:
1. Economics: Cutting tax rates in order to stimulate steady, wide-spread economic growth and acceptance of the necessity of the risks inherent in that growth, such as budget deficits, as well as the potential benefits, such as budget surpluses.

2. Domestic Affairs: Preferring strong government but not intrusive government, slight acceptance of the welfare state, adherence to social conservatism, and disapproval of counterculture

3. Foreign Policy: Patriotism is a necessity, world government is a terrible idea, the ability to distinguish friend from foe, protecting national interest both at home and abroad, and the necessity of a strong military.

At the expense of being considered sarcastic, that is about as much as this administration is capable of digesting, and tried they have!

There is a widespread impression that domestic policy does not define neoconservatism, that it is a movement founded on, and perpetuated by an aggressive approach to foreign policy, free trade, opposition to communism during the Cold War, support for Israel and Taiwan and opposition to Middle Eastern and other states that are perceived to support terrorism.

Given only the cursory examination of this administrations policy penchants; the conclusion is inescapable: “that is a mistaken notion given the nature of the selective content adoption of the Necon package this administration.”

The movement began to focus on such foreign issues in the mid-1970s. However it first crystallized in the late 1960s as an effort to combat the radical cultural changes taking place within the United States. Irving Kristol wrote: “If there is any one thing that neoconservatives are unanimous about, it is their dislike of the counterculture.” Norman Podhoretz agreed: “Revulsion against the counterculture accounted for more converts to neoconservativism than any other single factor."

{ In sociology, counterculture is a term used to describe a cultural group whose values and norms of behavior run counter to those of the social mainstream of the day, the cultural equivalent of political opposition. Although distinct countercultural undercurrents exist in all societies, here the term counterculture refers to a more significant, visible phenomenon that reaches critical mass and persists for a period of time. A counterculture movement thus expresses the ethos, aspirations and dreams of a specific population during a certain period of time — a social manifestation of zeitgeist.

In contemporary times, counterculture came to prominence in the news media as it was used to refer to the youth rebellion that swept North America, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand during the 1960s and early 1970s. Earlier countercultural milieux in 19th century Europe included the traditions of Romanticism, Bohemianism and of the Dandy. Another important movement existed in a more fragmentary form in the 1950s, both in Europe and the US, in the form of the Beat generation (Beatniks), who typically sported beards, wore roll-neck sweaters, read the novels of Albert Camus and listened to Jazz music. ( I guess this means me, and my generation, see Letter #1)

Counterculture is generally used to describe a theological, cultural, attitudinal or material position that does not conform to accepted societal norms. Yet, counterculture movements are often co-opted to spearhead commercial campaigns. Thus once taboo ideas (men wearing a woman's color — pink, for example) sometimes become popular trends.}

Ira Chernus, a professor at the University of Colorado, argues that the deepest root of the neoconservative movement is its fear that the counterculture would undermine the authority of traditional values and moral norms.


Because neoconservatives believe that human nature is innately selfish, they believe that a society with no commonly accepted values based on religion or ancient tradition will end up in a war of all against all. (Hobbes )

They also believe that the most important social value is strength, especially the strength to control natural impulses. The only alternative, they assume, is weakness that will let impulses run riot and lead to social chaos.

According to Peter Steinfels, a historian of the movement, the neoconservatives' "emphasis on foreign affairs emerged after the New Left and the counterculture had dissolved as convincing foils for neoconservatism . . . The essential source of their anxiety is not military or geopolitical or to be found overseas at all; it is domestic and cultural and ideological." Neoconservative foreign policy parallels their domestic policy. They insist that the U.S. military must be strong enough to control the world, or else the world will descend into chaos.

Believing that America should "export democracy," that is, spread its ideals of government, economics, and culture abroad, they grew to reject U.S. reliance on international organizations and treaties to accomplish these objectives.

Compared to other U.S. conservatives, neoconservatives may be characterized by an idealist stance on foreign policy, a lesser social conservatism, and a much weaker dedication to a policy of minimal government, and, in the past, a greater acceptance of the welfare state, though none of these qualities are necessarily requisite.

Aggressive support for democracies and nation building is founded on a belief that, over the long term, it will reduce the extremism that is a breeding ground for Islamic terrorism. Neoconservatives, along with many other political theorists, have argued that democratic regimes are less likely to instigate a war than a country with an authoritarian form of government.

Further, they argue that the lack of freedoms, lack of economic opportunities, and the lack of secular general education in authoritarian regimes promotes radicalism and extremism. Consequently, neoconservatives advocate the spread of democracy to regions of the world where it currently does not prevail, most notably the Arab nations of the Middle East, communist China, North Korea and Iran.

Neoconservatives also have a very strong belief in the ability of the United States to install democracy after a conflict - comparisons with denazification in Germany and installing a democratic government in Japan starting in 1945 are often made - and they have a principled belief in defending democracies against aggression. This belief has guided U.S. policy in Iraq after the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime, where the U.S. insisted on organizing elections as soon as practical.

As compared with traditional conservatism and libertarianism, which sometimes exhibit an isolationist strain, neoconservatism is characterized by an increased emphasis on defense capability, a willingness to challenge regimes deemed hostile to the values and interests of the United States, pressing for free-market policies abroad, and promoting democracy and freedom. Neoconservatives are strong believers in democratic peace theory.

(The democratic peace theory, liberal peace theory, or simply the democratic peace is a theory and related empirical research in international relations, political science, and philosophy which holds that democracies—usually, liberal democracies—never or almost never go to war with one another.)

The original theory and research on wars has been followed by many similar theories and related research on the relationship between democracy and peace, including that lesser conflicts than wars are also rare between democracies, and that systematic violence is in general less common within democracies.)

Let us examine the body of thought by examining the most accessible document relevant to the Bush Administration’s brand of neoconservatism. The document, brief as it is, is important in that many of the Bush administration, on the payroll or advisors contributed to and approved of this final draft.

June 3, 1997 NEOPAC ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLES

American foreign and defense policy is adrift. Conservatives have criticized the incoherent policies of the Clinton Administration. They have also resisted isolationist impulses from within their own ranks. But conservatives have not confidently advanced a strategic vision of America's role in the world. They have not set forth guiding principles for American foreign policy. They have allowed differences over tactics to obscure potential agreement on strategic objectives. And they have not fought for a defense budget that would maintain American security and advance American interests in the new century.

We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership.

As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests?

We are in danger of squandering the opportunity and failing the challenge. We are living off the capital -- both the military investments and the foreign policy achievements -- built up by past administrations. Cuts in foreign affairs and defense spending, inattention to the tools of statecraft, and inconstant leadership are making it increasingly difficult to sustain American influence around the world. And the promise of short-term commercial benefits threatens to override strategic considerations. As a consequence, we are jeopardizing the nation's ability to meet present threats and to deal with potentially greater challenges that lie ahead.
We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities.

Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership.

Our aim is to remind Americans of these lessons and to draw their consequences for today. Here are four consequences:

• We need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;
• We need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;
• We need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;
• We need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.
Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next.
There is no question the Bush Administration reflects, almost in total, the inclusion of the most, and the most problematic principles and ideas of the Neocon approach to government and their world vision. That should as no surprise when we reveal the numbers of Neocons within the administration and others that have an immediate ear in the White House and “audience immediate” upon request!


THE BUSH DOCTRINE

The Bush Doctrine, promulgated after September 11th, incorporates the concept that nations harboring terrorists are themselves enemies of the United States. It also embraces the Clinton Doctrine, which is the view that pre-emptive military action is justified to protect the United States from the threat of terrorism or attack.

That concept finds fairly broad acceptance in the general public. The notion becomes problematic, however, when an administration is all to willing to “allege a threat(s)”, knowing full well that none exists and then acts under this umbrella for totally specious and unspoken motives.

We are embroiled, entangled in the Mid East currently, as part of a “grand stradegy” to root out terrorism and bring democracy to yet another nation. We are there shedding the blood of our young in the name of democracy, to protect “our national interests”, to combat international terrorism originally, and falaciously linked to 9/11; not one word spoken on the record of OIL! Not one word is candidly spoken about establishing a balance of power in the region that serves the administration’s interests.

Both doctrines state that the United States "will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."

Given third world nation’s embrace of the stradegy of waiting The United States out while we exhaust our resources of war materials faster than we can replace them and the American populus becomes war weary, the will to continue wanes, and the administration finally has to deal with criticisms of and resistance to a primary objective, the need to surpass our over all military might becomes negated in regional conflicts. The attrition of men and materials adds up quickly while other local sources of weaponry approriate to the task of inflicting daily casualties on American forces is freely supplied those who are resisting this nation. The Iraqi Resistance has no problems of weapon supply, in fact, in recent days they have demonstrated possession of sophistocated ordinance.

Iran is “alleged, suspected” to be the source of supply. This administration, given its’ desire, and we all know that desire is there, to exercise a preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities lest they become, at minimum, a regional nuclear threat with which we and Isreal would have to contend. I would again point out, that given limitations even this administration has to contend with (they are not quite at the point where they can do anything they want without repurcussion). The Iran Issue is currently in full view with charge and counter charges being bandied about in the press.

The Bush Administration is holding that Iran is “responsible” for the appearance of the new ordinance and is attempting to make the case that the Irainian government is “implicated”, while government is asserting that while Irianian weaponry may have found its way into Iraq, that it may well be the result of private groups “sympathic to those opposing the American occupation”, moving the material through the porosity of the border. The problem the administration has, is that the media has been forecasting a possible “Iranian Invasion” as Bush’s last war for sometime, and the administration has no credibilty left. They are currently boxed into having to suggest Interdiction of the arms flow, while the media has already set out the story line: “Interdiction followed by Invasion”.

There is no trust available, and coupled with a rush “on paper” look semi reasonable agreement with North Korea being touted at the moment, one gets the feeling that a smoke screen has gone up, as the agreement is merely a rehash of a 1996 proposal that has no long range certainty of solution. It is momentary diplomatic window dressing devoid of any meaningful substance likely to collect. like fly paper, criticisms of financial obligation on our part, and appearances of appeasement and having been black mailed, a real classic smoke and mirrors proposition.

The Neocon Doctrine, or its’ principles as “selective chosen/applied” by the Bush, administration can only be seen as marking the abandonment of a focus on the doctrine of deterrence (in the Cold War through Mutually Assured Destruction) as the primary means of self-defense. While there have been occasional preemptive strikes by American forces, until recently preemptive strikes have not been an official American foreign and military policy.

Neoconservatives won a landmark victory with the Bush Doctrine after September 11th. Thomas Donnelly, a resident fellow at the influential conservative think-tank, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), which has been under neoconservative influence since the Reagan Administration, argued in "The Underpinnings of the Bush doctrine":

“that the fundamental premise of the Bush Doctrine is true: The United States possesses the means—economic, military, diplomatic—to realize its expansive geopolitical purposes. Further, and especially in light of the domestic political reaction to the attacks of September 11, the victory in Afghanistan and the remarkable skill demonstrated by President Bush in focusing national attention, it is equally true that Americans possess the requisite political will power to pursue an expansive strategy."

A bloated deficit ridden national budget, a beleagured supply short, weapons short military recycling troops, no one listening or talking, the world sickened by our ambitions, a coalition of the “willing” (really the coaltion of the obligated), an administration mocked with “cry wolf” anologies, condemned for its lies and lawlessness, rejected resoundingly in the November Elections, surrounded with scandals, corruption, investigations, mounting Impeachment talk and preparations in as yet “private quarters”, marches and protests growing in frequency, numbers and planning, a nation turned war weary and against the war; the assumptions have proven false and the political capital has been squandered by a President who at best can be labeled mediocre and at worst an incompetent criminal.

In his well-publicized piece "The Case for American Empire" in the conservative Weekly Standard, Max Boot argued that "The most realistic response to terrorism is for America to embrace its imperial role." He countered sentiments that the "United States must become a kinder, gentler nation, must eschew quixotic missions abroad, must become, in Pat Buchanan's phrase, 'a republic, not an empire'," arguing that "In fact this analysis is exactly backward: The September 11 attack was a result of insufficient American involvement and ambition; the solution is to be more expansive in our goals and more assertive in their implementation."

President Bush has expressed praise for Natan Sharansky's book, The Case For Democracy, which promotes a foreign policy philosophy nearly identical to neoconservatives'. President Bush has effusively praised this book, calling it a "glimpse of how I think". [17]

It has been read and praised by President George W. Bush. Other members of his administration, such as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, have also read the book.

Washington Times interview with George Bush where he comments on the book
Mr. Bush: If you want a glimpse of how I think about foreign policy read Natan Sharansky's book "The Case for Democracy." Anybody read it? Read it. It's a great book. And I think it will help - it will help explain a lot of the decisions that you'll see being made - you've seen made and will continue to see made. And it will help explain what's going to happen in the Palestinian territories as far as we're concerned. For government, particularly for opinion makers, I would put it on your recommended reading list. It's short and it's good. This guy is an heroic figure, as you know. It's a great book.

For some reason, the president’s reading habits — every president’s reading habits — seem to generate considerable media interest. Apparently, it’s a peek into the president’s personality, coupled with insight into what might help influence his perspective.

But in order for these reading lists to be valuable, we have to believe the books are actually being read. In Bush’s case, I’m just not so sure.

President George W. Bush faced major security challenges on three fronts on and as he prepared to return to Washington after a 10-day working vacation at his ranch, Bush puts down his summer reading — including Albert Camus’ “The Stranger,” and two books on Civil War President Abraham Lincoln — in favor of presidential briefing books.

Reading about Lincoln isn’t much of a stretch. Bush very well may consider himself something of a Lincoln-esque figure, fighting a costly war while enduring intense political criticism.

But Camus? I have a really tough time buying this one.
We all like to joke about Bush’s limited intellectual prowess, but I think it’s safe to say even staunch Bush allies would concede that the president is not exactly “book smart.”

According to his own carefully-crafted narrative, Bush is driven by instinct.

By the president’s own admission, he doesn’t read newspapers and he won’t pore over briefing books; Bush will instead hire a loyal team he can rely on to distill information and offer him choices, which he will make based on his gut.

He is not, in other words, the kind of guy who reads Camus on vacation, in between brush-clearing and bike-rides in which he’ll shout “air assault!” to his companions.

Moreover, “The Stranger” is not … how do I put this gently … an easy read. It’s a novel steeped in philosophy, most notably Camus’ existentialism, and delves into a not-so-subtle atheism (Meursault rejects any suggestion of embracing religion and believes there are no supernatural influences on humanity).

If Bush has decided to branch out and challenge himself, considering a world view that is clearly at odds with his own, I’ll be the first to congratulate him. But based on everything I’ve seen of the president, I simply find it hard to believe. I’m not suggesting the president offer us a book report, but if he wanted to take a moment, perhaps at his next press conference, to share his reaction to the book, I’d be anxious to hear his perspective.

By the way,and just an aside, if Bush did read the book, what will the GOP base think about the president picking up an existentialist novel with atheistic themes



Though Paul Wolfowitz started out as leader of the pack in the administration, there have been limits in the power of neoconservatives in the Bush administration. The former Secretary of State Colin Powell (as well as the State department as a whole) was largely seen as being an opponent of neoconservative ideas. However, with the resignation of Colin Powell and the promotion of Condoleezza Rice, along with widespread resignations within the State department, the neoconservative point of view within the Bush administration has been solidified. While the neoconservative notion of tough and decisive action has been apparent in U.S. policy toward the Middle East, it has not been seen in U.S. policy toward China and Russia or in the handling of the North Korean nuclear crisis.

IMPACT OF 2003 IRAQ WAR ON NEOCONSERVATIVE PHILOSOPHY AND INFLUENCE

NEOCONSERVATISM AND CHARGES OF APPEASEMENT

Neoconservative proponents of the 2003 Iraq War likened the conflict to Churchill's stand against Hitler. Former United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld likened Hussein to Stalin and Hitler. President George W. Bush singled out Iraq's dictator as the "great evil" who "by his search for terrible weapons, by his ties to terrorist groups, threatens the security of every free nation, including the free nations of Europe."

In the writings of Paul Wolfowitz, Norman Podhoretz, Elliott Abrams, Richard Perle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Max Boot, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, William Bennett, Peter Rodman, and others influential in forging the foreign policy doctrines of the Bush administration, there are frequent references to the appeasement of Hitler at Munich in 1938, to which are compared the Cold War's policies of détente and containment (rather than rollback) with the Soviet Union and the PRC.

While more conventional foreign policy experts argued that Iraq could be restrained by enforcing No-Fly Zones and by a policy of inspection by United Nations inspectors to restrict its ability to possess chemical or nuclear weapons, neoconservatives considered this policy direction ineffectual and labeled it appeasement of Saddam Hussein.

JUST WHO ARE THESE PEOPLE? ( Neoconservative Thinkers)
Irving Kristol[1]
Daniel Bell[1]
Irving Howe[1]
Nathan Glazer[1]
Daniel Patrick Moynihan[1]
PNAC Members
DIRECTORS
William Kristol[2]
Robert Kagan[2]
Bruce P. Jackson[2]
Mark Gerson[2]
Randy Scheunemann[2]
STAFF
Ellen Bork, Acting Executive Director[2]
Gary Schmitt, Senior Fellow[2]
Thomas Donnelly, Senior Fellow[2]
Reuel Marc Gerecht, Senior Fellow, Director of the Middle East Initiative[2]
Timothy Lehmann, Assistant Director[2]
Michael Goldfarb[2]
PAST/PRESENT MEMBERS OF BUSH ADMINISTRATION
John Bolton, Ambassador to the UN (2005-2006).
Lewis 'Scooter' Libby, founding member of PNAC and Chief of Staff to the Vice President (2001-2005)
Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (2001-2003).
Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense (2001-2006).
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense (2001-2005) and architect of the Bush Doctrine.
NEOCONSERVATIVE WRITERS
Francis Fukuyama
Michael Ledeen
Norman Podhoretz
Charles Krauthammer
Michael Gove, British Member of Parliament (2005-) and journalist.
Henry Jackson, US Congressman and Senator (1941-1983).
Alan Keyes, former diplomat and Senate candidate for Illinois. [3]
Francis Fukuyama, A Small Turning Point In The Making

Fukuyama is a prolific widely read, highly regarded “Intellectual” writer in Neocon circles, and as such I am going to spend a bit of time presenting some of his writing and the controversy(ies) that surround him and his work.

EDUCATION

He received his B.A. in classics from Cornell University, where he studied political philosophy under Allan Bloom, his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science, and is currently Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International political economy and Director of the International Development Program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University.
He has been affiliated with the Telluride Association since his undergraduate years at Cornell, an educational enterprise that was home to other significant leaders and intellectuals, including the Nobel Laureate Steven Weinberg and the defense and foreign affairs official, Paul Wolfowitz.
WRITINGS


Fukuyama is best known as the author of The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy after the end of the Cold War and when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.

Fukuyama's prophecy declares the eventual triumph of political and economic liberalism.

Fukuyama's thesis in this first book was based on a misprision (a "creative misreading" or "distortion") of Kojeve and Hegel's thesis that history in the limited sense of the struggle of ideologies had ended in the 19th century.

Fukuyama's work presumes that human nature is governed by a desire for recognition, and since only liberal democracy provides a way of satisfying the need for recognition, liberal democracy provides the end point of history.
But let us consider Fukuyama’s ideas in his own words.

The distant origins of the present volume lie in an article entitled “The End of History?” which I wrote for the journal The National Interest in the summer of 1989.

In it, I argued that a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism. More than that, however, I argued that liberal democracy may constitute the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government,” and as such constituted the “end of history.”

That is, while earlier forms of government were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions. This was not to say that today’s stable democracies, like the United States, France, or Switzerland, were not without injustice or serious social problems. But these problems were ones of incomplete implementation of the twin principles of liberty and equality on which modern democracy is founded, rather than of flaws in the principles themselves.

While some present-day countries might fail to achieve stable liberal democracy, and others might lapse back into other, more primitive forms of rule like theocracy or military dictatorship, the ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved on.

The original article excited an extraordinary amount of commentary and controversy, first in the United States, and then in a series of countries as different as England, France, Italy, the Soviet Union, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, and South Korea. Criticism took every conceivable form, some of it based on simple misunderstanding of my original intent, and others penetrating more perceptively to the core of my argument.

Many people were confused in the first instance by my use of the word “history.” Understanding history in a conventional sense as the occurrence of events, people pointed to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Chinese communist crackdown in Tiananmen Square, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as evidence that “history was continuing,” and that I was ipso facto proven wrong.

And yet what I suggested had come to an end was not the occurrence of events, even large and grave events, but History: that is, history understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process, when taking into account the experience of all peoples in all times.

This understanding of History was most closely associated with the great German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel. It was made part of our daily intellectual atmosphere by Karl Marx, who borrowed this concept of History from Hegel, and is implicit in our use of words like “primitive” or “advanced,” “traditional” or “modern,” when referring to different types of human societies.

For both of these thinkers, there was a coherent development of human societies from simple tribal ones based on slavery and subsistence agriculture, through various theocracies, monarchies, and feudal aristocracies, up through modern liberal democracy and technologically driven capitalism.

This evolutionary process was neither random nor unintelligible, even if it did not proceed in a straight line, and even if it was possible to question whether man was happier or better off as a result of historical “progress.”

Both Hegel and Marx believed that the evolution of human societies was not open-ended, but would end when mankind had achieved a form of society that satisfied its deepest and most fundamental longings.

Both thinkers thus posited an “end of history”: for Hegel this was the liberal state, while for Marx it was a communist society.

This did not mean that the natural cycle of birth, life, and death would end, that important events would no longer happen, or that newspapers reporting them would cease to be published. It meant, rather, that there would be no further progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really big questions had been settled.

The present book is not a restatement of my original article, nor is it an effort to continue the discussion with that article’s many critics and commentators.

Least of all is it an account of the end of the Cold War, or any other pressing topic in contemporary politics. While this book is informed by recent world events, its subject returns to a very old question: Whether, at the end of the twentieth century, it makes sense for us once again to speak of a coherent and directional History of mankind that will eventually lead the greater part of humanity to liberal democracy?

The answer I arrive at is yes, for two separate reasons. One has to do with economics, and the other has to do with what is termed the “struggle for recognition.”

It is of course not sufficient to appeal to the authority of Hegel, Marx, or any of their contemporary followers to establish the validity of a directional History.

In the century and a half since they wrote, their intellectual legacy has been relentlessly assaulted from all directions. The most profound thinkers of the twentieth century have directly attacked the idea that history is a coherent or intelligible process; indeed, they have denied the possibility that any aspect of human life is philosophically intelligible.

We in the West have become thoroughly pessimistic with regard to the possibility of overall progress in democratic institutions. This profound pessimism is not accidental, but born of the truly terrible political events of the first half of the twentieth century – two destructive world wars, the rise of totalitarian ideologies, and the turning of science against man in the form of nuclear weapons and environmental damage.

The life experiences of the victims of this past century’s political violence – from the survivors of Hitlerism and Stalinism to the victims of Pol Pot – would deny that there has been such a thing as historical progress. Indeed, we have become so accustomed by now to expect that the future will contain bad news with respect to the health and security of decent, liberal, democratic political practices that we have problems recognizing good news when it comes.

And yet, good news has come. The most remarkable development of the last quarter of the twentieth century has been the revelation of enormous weaknesses at the core of the world’s seemingly strong dictatorships, whether they be of the military-authoritarian Right, or the communist-totalitarian Left. From Latin America to Eastern Europe, from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and Asia, strong governments have been failing over the last two decades.

And while they have not given way in all cases to stable liberal democracies, liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe. In addition, liberal principles in economics – the “free market” – have spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity, both in industrially developed countries and in countries that had been, at the close of World War II, part of the impoverished Third World. A liberal revolution in economic thinking has sometimes preceded, sometimes followed, the move toward political freedom around the globe.

All of these developments, so much at odds with the terrible history of the first half of the century when totalitarian governments of the Right and Left were on the march, suggest the need to look again at the question of whether there is some deeper connecting thread underlying them, or whether they are merely accidental instances of good luck.

By raising once again the question of whether there is such a thing as a Universal History of mankind, I am resuming a discussion that was begun in the early nineteenth century, but more or less abandoned in our time because of the enormity of events that mankind has experienced since then. While drawing on the ideas of philosophers like Kant and Hegel who have addressed this question before, I hope that the arguments presented here will stand on their own.

This volume immodestly presents not one but two separate efforts to outline such a Universal History.

After establishing in Part I why we need to raise once again the possibility of Universal History, I propose an initial answer in Part II by attempting to use modern natural science as a regulator or mechanism to explain the directionality and coherence of History.

Modern natural science is a useful starting point because it is the only important social activity that by common consensus is both cumulative and directional, even if its ultimate impact on human happiness is ambiguous. The progressive conquest of nature made possible with the development of the scientific method in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has proceeded according to certain definite rules laid down not by man, but by nature and nature’s laws.

The unfolding of modern natural science has had a uniform effect on all societies that have experienced it, for two reasons. In the first place, technology confers decisive military advantages on those countries that possess it, and given the continuing possibility of war in the international system of states, no state that values its independence can ignore the need for defensive modernization.

Second, modern natural science establishes a uniform horizon of economic production possibilities. Technology makes possible the limitless accumulation of wealth, and thus the satisfaction of an ever-expanding set of human desires. This process guarantees an increasing homogenisation of all human societies, regardless of their historical origins or cultural inheritances.

All countries undergoing economic modernization must increasingly resemble one another: they must unify nationally on the basis of a centralized state, urbanize, replace traditional forms of social organization like tribe, sect, and family with economically rational ones based on function and efficiency, and provide for the universal education of their citizens.

Such societies have become increasingly linked with one another through global markets and the spread of a universal consumer culture. Moreover, the logic of modern natural science would seem to dictate a universal evolution in the direction of capitalism.

The experiences of the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries indicate that while highly centralized economies are sufficient to reach the level of industrialization represented by Europe in the 1950s, they are woefully inadequate in creating what have been termed complex “post-industrial” economies in which information and technological innovation play a much larger role.

But while the historical mechanism represented by modern natural science is sufficient to explain a great deal about the character of historical change and the growing uniformity of modern societies, it is not sufficient to account for the phenomenon of democracy.

There is no question but that the world’s most developed countries are also its most successful democracies. But while modern natural science guides us to the gates of the Promised Land of liberal democracy, it does not deliver us to the Promised Land itself, for there is no economically necessary reason why advanced industrialization should produce political liberty.

Stable democracy has at times emerged in pre-industrial societies, as it did in the United States in 1776. On the other hand, there are many historical and contemporary examples of technologically advanced capitalism coexisting with political authoritarianism from Meiji Japan and Bismarckian Germany to present-day Singapore and Thailand.

In many cases, authoritarian states are capable of producing rates of economic growth unachievable in democratic societies.

Our first effort to establish the basis for a directional history is thus only partly successful.

What we have called the “logic of modern natural science” is in effect an economic interpretation of historical change, but one which (unlike its Marxist variant) leads to capitalism rather than socialism as its final result.

The logic of modern science can explain a great deal about our world: why we residents of developed democracies are office workers rather than peasants eking out a living on the land, why we are members of labor unions or professional organizations rather than tribes or clans, why we obey the authority of a bureaucratic superior rather than a priest, why we are literate and speak a common national language.

But economic interpretations of history are incomplete and unsatisfying, because man is not simply an economic animal.

In particular, such interpretations cannot really explain why we are democrats, that is, proponents of the principle of popular sovereignty and the guarantee of basic rights under a rule of law.

It is for this reason that the book turns to a second, parallel account of the historical process in Part III, an account that seeks to recover the whole of man and not just his economic side.

To do this, we return to Hegel and Hegel’s non-materialist account of History, based on the “struggle for recognition.”

According to Hegel, human beings like animals have natural needs and desires for objects outside themselves such as food, drink, shelter, and above all the preservation of their own bodies.

Man differs fundamentally from the animals; however, because in addition he desires the desire of other men, that is, he wants to be “recognized.” In particular, he wants to be recognized as a human being, that is, as a being with a certain worth or dignity.

This worth in the first instance is related to his willingness to risk his life in a struggle over pure prestige. For only man is able to overcome his most basic animal instincts – chief among them his instinct for self-preservation – for the sake of higher, abstract principles and goals.

According to Hegel, the desire for recognition initially drives two primordial combatants to seek to make the other “recognize” their humanness by staking their lives in a mortal battle. When the natural fear of death leads one combatant to submit, the relationship of master and slave is born.

The stakes in this bloody battle at the beginning of history are not food, shelter, or security, but pure prestige. And precisely because the goal of the battle is not determined by biology, Hegel sees in it the first glimmer of human freedom.


The desire for recognition may at first appear to be an unfamiliar concept, but it is as old as the tradition of Western political philosophy, and constitutes a thoroughly familiar part of the human personality.

It was first described by Plato in the Republic, when he noted that there were three parts to the soul, a desiring part, a reasoning part, and a part that he called thymos, or “spiritedness.” Much of human behavior can be explained as a combination of the first two parts, desire and reason: desire induces men to seek things outside themselves, while reason or calculation shows them the best way to get them.

But in addition, human beings seek recognition of their own worth, or of the people, things, or principles that they invest with worth. The propensity to invest the self with a certain value, and to demand recognition for that value, is what in today’s popular language we would call “self-esteem.”

The propensity to feel self-esteem arises out of the part of the soul called emos. It is like an innate human sense of justice. People believe that they have a certain worth, and when other people treat them as though they are worth less than that, they experience the emotion of anger. Conversely, when people fail to live up to their own sense of worth, they feel shame, and when they are evaluated correctly in proportion to their worth, they feel pride.

The desire for recognition, and the accompanying emotions of anger, shame, and pride, are parts of the human personality critical to political life. According to Hegel, they are what drives the whole historical process.

By Hegel’s account, the desire to be recognized as a human being with dignity drove man at the beginning of history into a bloody battle to the death for prestige.

The outcome of this battle was a division of human society into a class of masters, who were willing to risk their lives, and a class of slaves, who gave in to their natural fear of death. But the relationship of lordship and bondage, which took a wide variety of forms in all of the unequal, aristocratic societies that have characterized the greater part of human history, failed ultimately to satisfy the desire for recognition of either the masters or the slaves.

The slave, of course, was not acknowledged as a human being in any way whatsoever. But the recognition enjoyed by the master was deficient as well, because he was not recognized by other masters, but slaves whose humanity was as yet incomplete. Dissatisfaction with the flawed recognition available in aristocratic societies constituted a “contradiction” that engendered further stages of history.

Hegel believed that the “contradiction” inherent in the relationship of lordship and bondage was finally overcome as a result of the French and, one would have to add, American revolutions. These democratic revolutions abolished the distinction between master and slave by making the former slaves their own masters and by establishing the principles of popular sovereignty and the rule of law.

The inherently unequal recognition of masters and slaves is replaced by universal and reciprocal recognition, where every citizen recognizes the dignity and humanity of every other citizen, and where that dignity is recognized in turn by the state through the granting of rights.

This Hegelian understanding of the meaning of contemporary liberal democracy differs in a significant way from the Anglo-Saxon understanding that was the theoretical basis of liberalism in countries like Britain and the United States. In that tradition, the prideful quest for recognition was to be subordinated to enlightened self-interest – desire combined with reason – and particularly the desire for self-preservation of the body.

While Hobbes, Locke, and the American Founding Fathers like Jefferson and Madison believed that rights to a large extent existed as a means of preserving a private sphere where men can enrich themselves and satisfy the desiring parts of their souls, Hegel saw rights as ends in themselves, because what truly satisfies human beings is not so much material prosperity as recognition of their status and dignity.

With the American and French revolutions, Hegel asserted that history comes to an end because the longing that had driven the historical process – the struggle for recognition – has now been satisfied in a society characterized by universal and reciprocal recognition. No other arrangement of human social institutions is better able to satisfy this longing, and hence no further progressive historical change is possible.

The desire for recognition, then, can provide the missing link between liberal economics and liberal politics that was missing from the economic account of History in Part II. Desire and reason are together sufficient to explain the process of industrialization, and a large part of economic life more generally. But they cannot explain the striving for liberal democracy, which ultimately arises out of thymos, the part of the soul that demands recognition.

The social changes that accompany advanced industrialization, in particular universal education, appear to liberate a certain demand for recognition that did not exist among poorer and less educated people. As standards of living increase, as populations become more cosmopolitan and better educated, and as society as a whole achieves a greater equality of condition, people begin to demand not simply more wealth but recognition of their status.

If people were nothing more than desire and reason, they would be content to live in market-oriented authoritarian states like Franco’s Spain, or a South Korea or Brazil under military rule. But they also have a thymotic pride in their own self-worth, and this leads them to demand democratic governments that treat them like adults rather than children, recognizing their autonomy as free individuals. Communism is being superseded by liberal democracy in our time because of the realization that the former provides a gravely defective form of recognition.

An understanding of the importance of the desire for recognition as the motor of history allows us to reinterpret many phenomena that are otherwise seemingly familiar to us, such as culture, religion, work, nationalism, and war.

Part IV is an attempt to do precisely this, and to project into the future some of the different ways that the desire for recognition will be manifest. A religious believer, for example, seeks recognition for his particular gods or sacred practices, while a nationalist demands recognition for his particular linguistic, cultural, or ethnic group.

Both of these forms of recognition are less rational than the universal recognition of the liberal state, because they are based on arbitrary distinctions between sacred and profane, or between human social groups. For this reason, religion, nationalism, and a people’s complex of ethical habits and customs (more broadly “culture”) have traditionally been interpreted as obstacles to the establishment of successful democratic political institutions and free-market economies.

But the truth is considerably more complicated, for the success of liberal politics and liberal economics frequently rests on irrational forms of recognition that liberalism was supposed to overcome.

For democracy to work, citizens need to develop an irrational pride in their own democratic institutions, and must also develop what Tocqueville called the “art of associating,” which rests on prideful attachment to small communities.

These communities are frequently based on religion, ethnicity, or other forms of recognition that fall short of the universal recognition on which the liberal state is based. The same is true for liberal economics. Labor has traditionally been understood in the Western liberal economic tradition as an essentially unpleasant activity undertaken for the sake of the satisfaction of human desires and the relief of human pain.

But in certain cultures with a strong work ethic, such as that of the Protestant entrepreneurs who created European capitalism, or of the elites who modernized Japan after the Meiji restoration, work was also undertaken for the sake of recognition. To this day, the work ethic in many Asian countries is sustained not so much by material incentives, as by the recognition provided for work by overlapping social groups, from the family to the nation, on which these societies are based.

This suggests that liberal economics succeeds not simply on the basis of liberal principles, but requires irrational forms of thymos as well.

The struggle for recognition provides us with insight into the nature of international politics. The desire for recognition that led to the original bloody battle for prestige between two individual combatants leads logically to imperialism and World Empire.

The relationship of lordship and bondage on a domestic level is naturally replicated on the level of states, where nations as a whole seek recognition and enter into bloody battles for supremacy. Nationalism, a modern yet not-fully-rational form of recognition, has been the vehicle for the struggle for recognition over the past hundred years, and the source of this century’s most intense conflicts.

This is the world of “power politics,” described by such foreign policy “realists” as Henry Kissinger.

But if war is fundamentally driven by the desire for recognition, it stands to reason that the liberal revolution which abolishes the relationship of lordship and bondage by making former slaves their own masters should have a similar effect on the relationship between states.

Liberal democracy replaces the irrational desire to be recognized as greater than others with a rational desire to be recognized as equal. A world made up of liberal democracies, then, should have much less incentive for war, since all nations would reciprocally recognize one another’s legitimacy. And indeed, there is substantial empirical evidence from the past couple of hundred years that liberal democracies do not behave imperialistically toward one another, even if they are perfectly capable of going to war with states that are not democracies and do not share their fundamental values.

Nationalism is currently on the rise in regions like Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union where peoples have long been denied their national identities, and yet within the world’s oldest and most secure nationalities, nationalism is undergoing a process of change. The demand for national recognition in Western Europe has been domesticated and made compatible with universal recognition, much like religion three or four centuries before.

The fifth and final part of this book addresses the question of the “end of history,” and the creature that emerges at the end, the “last man.”

In the course of the original debate over the National Interest article, many people assumed that the possibility of the end of history revolved around the question of whether there were viable alternatives to liberal democracy visible in the world today. There was a great deal of controversy over such questions as whether communism was truly dead, whether religion or ultranationalism might make a comeback, and the like. But the deeper and more profound question concerns the goodness of Liberal democracy itself, and not only whether it will succeed against its present-day rivals.

Assuming that liberal democracy is, for the moment, safe from external enemies, could we assume that successful democratic societies could remain that way indefinitely? Or is liberal democracy prey to serious internal contradictions, contradictions so serious that they will eventually undermine it as a political system?

There is no doubt that contemporary democracies face any number of serious problems, from drugs, homelessness and crime to environmental damage and the frivolity of consumerism. But these problems are not obviously insoluble on the basis of liberal principles, nor so serious that they would necessarily lead to the collapse of society as a whole, as communism collapsed in the 1980s.

Writing in the twentieth century, Hegel’s great interpreter, Alexandre Kojève, asserted intransigently that history had ended because what he called the “universal and homogeneous state” – what we can understand as liberal democracy – definitely solved the question of recognition by replacing the relationship of lordship and bondage with universal and equal recognition.

What man had been seeking throughout the course of history – what had driven the prior “stages of history” – was recognition. In the modern world, he finally found it, and was “completely satisfied.”

This claim was made seriously by Kojève, and it deserves to be taken seriously by us.

For it is possible to understand the problem of politics over the millennia of human history as the effort to solve the problem of recognition. Recognition is the central problem of politics because it is the origin of tyranny, imperialism, and the desire to dominate.

But while it has a dark side, it cannot simply be abolished from political life, because it is simultaneously the psychological ground for political virtues like courage, public-spiritedness, and justice.

All political communities must make use of the desire for recognition, while at the same time protecting themselves from its destructive effects. If contemporary constitutional government has indeed found a formula whereby all are recognized in a way that nonetheless avoids the emergence of tyranny, then it would indeed have a special claim to stability and longevity among the regimes that have emerged on earth.

But is the recognition available to citizens of contemporary liberal democracies “completely satisfying?” The long-term future of liberal democracy, and the alternatives to it that may one day arise, depend above all on the answer to this question.

In Part V we sketch two broad responses, from the Left and the Right, respectively. The Left would say that universal recognition in liberal democracy is necessarily incomplete because capitalism creates economic inequality and requires a division of labor that ipso facto implies unequal recognition. In this respect, a nation’s absolute level of prosperity provides no solution, because there will continue to be those who are relatively poor and therefore invisible as human beings to their fellow citizens. Liberal democracy, in other words, continues to recognize equal people unequally.

The second, and in my view more powerful, criticism of universal recognition comes from the Right that was profoundly concerned with the leveling effects of the French Revolution’s commitment to human equality.

This Right found its most brilliant spokesman in the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, whose views were in some respects anticipated by that great observer of democratic societies, Alexis de Tocqueville.

Nietzsche believed that modern democracy represented not the self-mastery of former slaves, but the unconditional victory of the slave and a kind of slavish morality. The typical citizen of a liberal democracy was a “last man” who, schooled by the founders of modern liberalism, gave up prideful belief in his or her own superior worth in favor of comfortable self-preservation.

Liberal democracy produced “men without chests,” composed of desire and reason but lacking thymos, clever at finding new ways to satisfy a host of petty wants through the calculation of long-term self-interest. The last man had no desire to be recognized as greater than others, and without such desire no excellence or achievement was possible. Content with his happiness and unable to feel any sense of shame for being unable to rise above those wants, the last man ceased to be human.

Following Nietzsche’s line of thought, we are compelled to ask the following questions: Is not the man who is completely satisfied by nothing more than universal and equal recognition something less than a full human being, indeed, an object of contempt, a “last man” with neither striving nor aspiration?

Is there not a side of the human personality that deliberately seeks out struggle, danger, risk, and daring, and will this side not remain unfulfilled by the “peace and prosperity” of contemporary liberal democracy?

Does not the satisfaction of certain human beings depend on recognition that is inherently unequal?

Indeed, does not the desire for unequal recognition constitute the basis of a livable life, not just for bygone aristocratic societies, but also in modern liberal democracies?

Will not their future survival depend, to some extent, on the degree to which their citizens seek to be recognized not just as equal, but as superior to others?

And might not the fear of becoming contemptible “last men” not lead men to assert themselves in new and unforeseen ways, even to the point of becoming once again bestial “first men” engaged in bloody prestige battles, this time with modern weapons?

This book seeks to address these questions. They arise naturally once we ask whether there is such a thing as progress, and whether we can construct a coherent and directional Universal History of mankind.

Totalitarianisms of the Right and Left have kept us too busy to consider the latter question seriously for the better part of this century. But the fading of these totalitarianisms, as the century comes to an end, invites us to raise this old question one more time.

Fukuyama has written a number of other books, among them Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. In the latter, he qualified his original "end of history" thesis, arguing that since biotechnology increasingly allows humans to control their own evolution, it may allow humans to alter "human nature", thereby putting Liberal Democracy at risk.

One possible outcome could be that an altered human nature could end in radical inequality. The current revolution in biological sciences leads him to theorize in an environment in which as he says history is not at an end because science and technology are not at an end.

Also among them is The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of Social Order. In this book, he explores where social norms come from and talks about how the current disruption, due to the shift from the manufacturing age to the information age, is normal and will correct itself due to the need for humans to have social norms and rules.

RELATIONSHIP TO NEOCONSERVATISM

Politically, Fukuyama has in the past been considered neoconservative. He was active in the Project for the New American Century think tank starting in 1997, and signed the organization's letter recommending that President Bill Clinton overthrow the then-President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein. [1] He also signed a second, similar letter to President George W. Bush after the September 11, 2001 attacks that called for removing Saddam Hussein from power "even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack."[2]

Thereafter, however, he drifted from the neoconservative agenda, which he felt had become overly militaristic and based on muscular, unilateral armed intervention to further democratization within authoritarian regimes (particularly in the Middle East).

Now Please remember this is a Neocon by anyone’s definition!
He did not approve of the 2003 invasion of Iraq as it was executed, and called for Donald Rumsfeld's resignation as Secretary of Defense [3]. He said that he would vote against Bush in the 2004 election,[4] and said Bush made three major mistakes:

(1) The threat of radical islamism to the US was overestimated.

(2) The Bush administration didn't foresee the fierce negative reaction to its benevolent hegemony. From the very beginning it showed a negative attitude towards the United Nations and other international organisations and didn't see that this would increase anti-Americanism in other countries.

(3) The Bush administration misjudged what was needed to bring peace in Iraq and was overly optimistic about the success with which social engineering of Western values could be applied to Iraq and the Middle East in general.

Fukuyama's current beliefs include the following: the US should use its power to promote democracy in the world, but more along the lines of what he calls realistic Wilsonianism, with military intervention only as a last resort and only in addition to other measures.

A latent military force is more likely to have an effect than actual deployment. The US spends more on its military than the rest of the world put together, but Iraq shows there are limits to its effectiveness.

The US should instead stimulate political and economic development and gain a better understanding of what happens in other countries.

The best instruments are setting a good example and providing education and, in many cases, money.

The secret of development, be it political or economic, is that it never comes from outsiders, but always from people in the country itself.

One thing the US is good at is the formation of international institutions. These would combine power with legitimacy. But such measures require a lot of patience.

This is the central thesis of his most recent work America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy.

In an essay in the New York Times Magazine in 2006 that was strongly critical of the invasion,[5] he identified neoconservatism with Leninism. He wrote that the neoconservatives:

...believed that history can be pushed along with the right application of power and will. Leninism was a tragedy in its Bolshevik version, and it has returned as farce when practiced by the United States. Neoconservatism, as both a political symbol and a body of thought, has evolved into something I can no longer support.

He also announced the end of the "neoconservative moment" and argued for the demilitarization of the war on terrorism:

"[W]ar" is the wrong metaphor for the broader struggle, since wars are fought at full intensity and have clear beginnings and endings. Meeting the jihadist challenge is more of a "long, twilight struggle" whose core is not a military campaign but a political contest for the hearts and minds of ordinary Muslims around the world.

If he has distanced himself from the label of neoconservatism, he remains indebted to Leo Strauss, purported father of neoconservatism, for much of the theoretical basis of his political economics. In Our Posthuman Future he takes a Straussian stance, defending a classical doctrine of natural right. He says his argument is Aristotelian and that:

Aristotle argued, in effect, that human notions of right and wrong--what we today call human rights--were ultimately based on human nature.

AFFILIATIONS

In August 2005 Fukuyama, together with a number of other prominent political thinkers, co-founded The American Interest, a quarterly magazine devoted to the broad theme of "America in the World". The editorial tone of the publication is largely bi-partisan and is an attempt to transcend the polemical discourse that dominates discussions of contemporary American foreign policy.

Fukuyama was a member of the President's Council on Bioethics from 2001-2005.

Fukuyama is on the steering committee for the Scooter Libby Legal Defense Trust. [6] Fukuyama is a long-time friend of Libby. They served together in the State Department in the 1980s.

Fukuyama is also a part-time photographer and has a keen interest in classical furniture which he makes by hand. He is married to Laura Holmgren and has three children.
Selected Bibliography
Books
The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press, 1992. ISBN 0-02-910975-2
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. Free Press, 1995. ISBN 0-02-910976-0
The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order. Free Press, 1999. ISBN 0-684-84530-X
Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002. ISBN 0-374-23643-7
State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Cornell University Press, 2004. ISBN 0-8014-4292-3
America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (Yale University Press, 2006). ISBN 0-300-11399-4
After the Neo Cons: Where the Right went Wrong. Profile Books, 2006. ISBN 1-86197-922-3 (N.B. Published in the US as America at the Crossroads see above)

ESSAYS

Women and the Evolution of World Politics, Foreign Affairs Oct 1998
Social capital and civil society, paper prepared for delivery at the IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms, 1 October 1999
Don't do it Britannia, Prospect, May 2000
Biotechnology: our slippery slope?, Prospect, June 2002
The neoconservative moment, The National Interest, Summer 2004
After neoconservatism, The New York Times Magazine, 19 February 2006
Supporter's voice now turns on Bush, The New York Times Magazine, 14 March 2006
Why shouldn't I change my mind?, Los Angeles Times, April 9, 2006
Japanese dilemma, Prospect, November 2006
Identity and migration, Prospect, February 2007


Francis Fukuyama says:

The US needs to reconceptualize its foreign policy now that conflict in Iraq has shattered neoconservative notion that US could impose democracy and human rights abroad by military force alone,

The US must demilitarize what it calls global war on terrorism and shift to other types of policy instruments;

The US must seek to establish effective international institutions that can confer legitimacy on collective action;

The US must also reform, reorganize and properly finance those institutions of US government that actually promote democracy, development and rule of law around the world. Are there welcomes signs within the Neocon inner circle that Bush administration is abandoning legacy of its first term? Yes but those signs are minimal and among the theorists, not the practitioners of the poisoned politics of this White House, so don’t hold your breath looking for an epiphany Pennsylvania Avenue, but a small sign found in an article excerpting from the forthcoming book, In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq.

The Iraq war: the journalist Nick Cohen writes a provocative book indicting former friends on the British left who opposed it.

In a mirror image, Francis Fukuyama's provocative book indicts former friends on the right who supported it. As Tony Blair observed in 2001, the kaleidoscope has been shaken.

Fukuyama achieved intellectual stardom as the author of The End of History, taken by many to mean that, with the death of communism, the triumph of liberal democracy was not only desirable but inevitable.

Such an interpretation seems likely to have encouraged the neoconservatives to go charging into Iraq on the assumption that, when the smoke cleared, democracy would fill the gap. But in this volume of self-justification, Fukuyama insists that he has nothing to apologies for because his theory was misunderstood.

He pleads that The End of History was actually asserting a universal desire for modernization, technology, healthcare, high living standards of which liberal democracy is a likely byproduct.

But plenty of cultural, economic and other contingent factors can get in the way. No idea, however powerful and seductive, is enough on its own.

The neocons imploded, he argues, not because they were neocons but because they forgot one of their own principles: to distrust ambitious social engineering projects, such as trying to act as midwife to Iraqi democracy. On how to get there he is somewhat vague. Fukuyama is readable, but some of his arguments smack of translating common sense into academese.

Nor does the book, based on a series of lectures he gave at Yale University in 2005, quite come together as a rounded polemic.
Reviewers of the hardback edition used words such as "devastating" and "brutal", but the tone is not as exciting as anger.
IT IS FUKUYAMA'S DEFECTION FROM THE NEOCONS ITSELF THAT IS MOST DAMNING!
FURTHER REFERENCES
Many associate neoconservatism with periodicals such as Commentary and The Weekly Standard, along with the foreign policy initiatives of think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). Neoconservative journalists, pundits, policy analysts, and politicians, often dubbed "neocons" by supporters and critics alike, have been credited with (or blamed for) their influence on U.S. foreign policy, especially under the administration of George W. Bush

ADDITION READINGS AND CULTURAL/INTELLECTAL EXPLORATION FOR GEORGE W. BUSH:
Noam Chomsky
FILM DIRECTORS
Woody Allen
Hideaki Anno
Michelangelo Antonioni
Ingmar Bergman
Robert Bresson
David Cronenberg
Jean-Luc Godard
Michel Gondry
Werner Herzog
Jim Jarmusch
Akira Kurosawa
Richard Linklater
Mamoru Oshii
Alain Robbe-Grillet
Harold Ramis
Éric Rohmer
David O. Russell
Andrei Tarkovsky
François Truffaut
Tom Tykwer
Luchino Visconti
NOVELISTS, POETS AND PLAYWRIGHTS
Kobo Abe
Edward Albee
Paul Auster
John Barth
Georges Bataille
Samuel Beckett
Simone de Beauvoir
Michel Butor
Albert Camus rejected being labeled an existentialist, but his thoughts and works are often characterized as having existentialist themes.
Louis-Ferdinand Celine
Noah Cicero
Joseph Conrad
Eugene Cullen
Philip K. Dick
Fyodor Dostoevsky lived in the Nineteenth century, well before the beginning of existentialism proper. Further, being a Russian Orthodox Christian, any ideological alliance with the likes of Sartre and other existentialists is highly speculative to say the least. But his is a major influence on many or most existentialist thinkers.
Marguerite Duras
Ralph Ellison
John Fowles
Jean Genet
André Gide
Anthony Farway
Knut Hamsun
Joseph Heller
Hermann Hesse
Henrik Ibsen
Eugène Ionesco
Franz Kafka
Jack Kerouac
Imre Kertész
Jerzy Kosinski
C. S. Lewis
Malcolm Lowry
André Malraux
Yukio Mishima
George Oppen
Chuck Palahniuk
Walker Percy
Harold Pinter
Rainer Maria Rilke
Alain Robbe-Grillet
Catherine Robbe-Grillet
José Saramago
Nathalie Sarraute
Claude Simon
Jean-Paul Sartre
Marquis de Sade pre-dated the existentialist movement by over one hundred years, but his writings affected it.
Ali Shariati
Tom Stoppard
Alexander Trocchi
Richard O. Russell
Miguel de Unamuno
Peter Weiss
O V Vijayan's most famous work, Khasakkinte Itihaasam (The Legend of Khasak) deals with existentialism.
Kurt Vonnegut
Richard Wright
Fritz Zorn existentialist author ("Mars"), died of cancer while writing about his neurosis
PHILOSOPHERS
Simone de Beauvoir
Nikolai Berdyaev
Henri Bergson
E. M. Cioran
William A. Earle
José Ortega y Gasset
Martin Heidegger rejected the label 'existentialist', but his ideas inspired Sartre and many others.
Karl Jaspers
Hans Jonas
Søren Kierkegaard lived before the existentialist movement began, and it is probable he would have rejected many tenets of Sartre's existentialism. Yet, he was of the first philosophers dealing with the problems of human existence in ways recognizable as forerunners of Sartrean existentialism.
Walter Kaufmann
Ladislav Klíma
Emmanuel Levinas
Gabriel Marcel
Like Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche lived before the existentialist movement began, and in many ways, differs from existentialism proper. Yet, his work is precursor to many of the developments in later existentialist thought.
Jean-Paul Sartre
Ramond Quole
Lev Shestov
Egoist, Max Stirner, lived before the existentialist movement of the twentieth century and cannot properly be referred to as an existentialist. He is an important predecessor to the existentialist thought.
Miguel de Unamuno
Peter Wessel Zapffe
Colin Wilson
Paul Ricoeur In his earlier writing, he was very existential, until he learned of hermeneutics
Mahmoud Khatami.
PSYCHOLOGISTS
Ernest Becker
Ludwig Binswanger
Medard Boss
Frantz Fanon
Viktor Frankl
Thomas Hora
R. D. Laing
Abraham H. Maslow
Rollo May
Theodore Shanks
Fritz Perls
Otto Rank
Irvin D. Yalom
THEOLOGIANS
Martin Buber
Rudolf Bultmann
John Macquarrie
Gabriel Marcel
Paul Tillich
David Layton
Samuel Kuhn

A SERIOUS REMINDER FOR GEORGE W. BUSH

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. --Such has been the patient sufferance of these colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government.


In Letter No.3 we will turn our attention to what we have really done in the Muslim World.